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Responding to Public School Peer Sexual 
Harassment in the Face of Davis v. Monroe 
County Board of Education 
INTRODUCTION 
Peer sexual harassment has existed in our elementary, sec-
ondary, and post-secondary schools for decades. 1 Recently, it 
has surfaced as a ubiquitous legal dilemma. In the past, schools 
have largely ignored peer sexual harassment claims. "Most of-
ten, schools responded to complaints by suggesting that the vic-
tim 'did something' to provoke the harassment or [by] shrug-
ging off the complaint as evidence that 'boys will be boys."'2 
There has been a pervasive view that peer sexual harassment 
is merely the result of social and sexual child development, 
that it is "an innocuous emergence of sexual curiosities and at-
tractions among adolescent students. The behavior, however, 
even if innocent, is dangerous."3 
In 1993, the American Association of University Women 
(AAUW) published a peer sexual harassment study. The study 
showed that 81% of students surveyed "had experienced some 
form of sexual harassment, ranging from sexual remarks to 
physical contact.4 A surprising 85% of girls and 76% of boys re-
ported experiencing 'unwanted and unwelcome sexual behavior 
1. See Should Schools Be Held Liable for Peer Sexual Harassment Under Title IX 
of the Education Amendments of 1972? 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 219 (Fall1996). 
2. Id. (quoting Doe v. Petaluma School District, 830 F. Supp. 1550, 1565 (N.D. 
Cal. 1993)). 
3. Laura M. Sullivan, An Evolutionary Perspective of Peer Sexual Harassment in 
American Schools: Premising Liability on Sexual, Rather Than Power Dynamics, 3 WM. 
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 329 (Spring 1997). 
4. See Karen Mellencamp Davis, Note, Reading, Writing, and Sexual Harass-
ment: Finding a Constitutional Remedy When Schools Fail to Address Peer Abuse, 69 
IND. L.J. 1123 (Fall 1994) (discussing the American Association of University Women 
Educational Foundation, "Hostile Hallways: The AAUW Survey on Sexual Harassment 
in American Schools" 7 (June 1993)). 
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that interferes with their lives."'5 Such sexual harassment can 
take place at any school activity, in the hallways, the class-
room, the cafeteria, on field trips, or at any other school spon-
sored area or event.6 Schools must prevent and respond imme-
diately and reasonably to peer sexual harassment. If left 
unchecked, sexual harassment will but worsen. In fact: 
The impact of sexual harassment on a student's educational 
progress and attainment of future goals can be significant and 
should not be underestimated. As a result of sexual harass-
ment, a student may, for example, have trouble learning, drop 
a class or drop out of school altogether, lose trust in school of-
ficials, become isolated, fear for personal safety, or lose self-
esteem.7 
Because schools have a responsibility to provide a safe edu-
cational environment, and because peer sexual harassment can 
have negative long-term psychological effects on student vic-
tims, schools "should not accept, tolerate or overlook sexual 
harassment."8 School officials, administrators, and teachers 
must educate themselves on sexual harassment law. They 
must then implement programs and policies responding to the 
current law in order to prevent and respond to peer sexual har-
assment, not only so that they may insulate their school boards 
and districts from liability, but so that they may also protect 
their students and provide them with the safe school environ-
ment students deserve. 
Part I of this note discusses the controversy that existed 
within the circuit courts prior to and contemporaneously with 
the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board 
of Education. 9 Part II sets forth the facts, the Court's holding, 
and reasoning in Davis. Part III continues to analyze the rea-
soning of the Court and discusses the rationale behind holding 
schools responsible and the impact Davis has on public school 
districts. Part IV discusses why schools should be held respon-
sible. Part V suggests methods, policies, and procedures that 
school administrators can implement in order to shield them-
selves from liability under Davis and protect students from 
5. Id. 
6. See Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment: It's 
Not Academic (visited Oct. 30, 1999) <http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/ocrshpam.html>. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999). 
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peer sexual harassment. 
I. THE CONTROVERSY IN THE CIRCUITS 
A. The Eleventh Circuit 
In February 1996, the Eleventh Circuit decided Davis v. 
Monroe County Board of Education. 10 The court held that peer 
sexual harassment is a cognizable claim under Title IX.11 The 
court analogized the school peer sexual harassment situation to 
a co-worker hostile work environment claim under Title VII. 
The Court first looked at the language of Title IX12 and stated 
that the issue in the case was "whether the Board's alleged 
failure to take action to stop G.F.'s sexual harassment of 
LaShonda 'excluded her from participation in, ... denied her 
the benefits of, or ... subjected her to discrimination under' the 
Monroe county educational system on the basis of her sex." 13 
The court stated that Title IX was enacted in order to pro-
tect people within the education system from discrimination 
based upon their sex.14 
To accomplish this goal, employees and students of federally 
funded educational institutions who are discriminated 
against on the basis of sex have a private right of action un-
der Title IX for injunctive relief and compensatory damages. 
Moreover, in interpreting Title IX, 'there is no doubt that if 
we are to give it the scope that its origins dictate, we must ac-
cord it a sweep as broad as its language.'15 
In order to accord such a sweep, the court reviewed this 
10. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. ofEduc., 74 F.3d 1186 (ll'h Cir. 1996). 
11. See id. at 1195. 
12. "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
educational program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... " Id. at 1189 
(quoting 20 U.S.C. §1681(a) (1988)). 
13. Davis, 74 F. 3d at 1189. 
14. See id. at 1190. Enacted in 1972, Title IX was designed to protect individuals 
from sex discrimination by denying federal financial aid to those educational institu-
tions that bear responsibility for sexually discriminatory practices. See id. Note that 
previously the only remedy available for Title IX claims was the denial of federal fund-
ing to the institution. However, in 1992, the Supreme Court allowed monetary dam-
ages to private plaintiffs for intentional violations of Title IX. Id. (citing Franklin v. 
Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992)). 
15. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1189 (citations omitted). 
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peer sexual harassment claim under Title VII principles, ra-
tionalizing that other courts have done so, and that these prin-
ciples are applied to sex discrimination claims made by teach-
ers and other school employees. The court also explained that 
the legislative history of Title IX "'strongly suggests that Con-
gress meant for similar substantive standards to apply under 
Title IX as had been developed under Title VII.'"16 
Furthermore, the court justified its application of Title VII 
to the Title IX context by saying that it had been specifically 
authorized by an extension of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs. 17 and by the Depart-
ment of Education's Office of Civil Rights. 18 Moreover, the court 
felt that "application of these principles to Title IX claims by 
students recognizes, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in 
Franklin, that a student should have the same protection in 
school that an employee has in the workplace."19 
Of course, there are differences between the workplace and 
school. The court acknowledged this by stating that these dif-
ferences only supported the need for greater protection against 
harassment in schools.20 The court also emphasized that teach-
ers have greater control and influence upon school children and 
that children also look to these authorities for protection.21 An-
other reason given for granting this protection is that harass-
ment in school can be more damaging to a child than similar 
behavior occurring to adults in the workplace. 22 The court also 
recognized that it is much harder for a child to change schools 
than for an adult to change jobs in order to escape the harass-
ment. 23 Furthermore: 
[a] nondiscriminatory environment is essential to maximum 
intellectual growth and is therefore an integral part of the 
educational benefits that a student receives. A sexually abu-
sive environment inhibits, if not prevents, the harassed stu-
16. Id. (quoting Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 897 (1"' Cir. 
1988)). 
17. 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992). Subsequently, several courts have understood Frank-
lin to authorize the application of Title VII standards to a student's Title IX sexual 
harassment claim against her school. See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1191. 
18. See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1191-92. 
19. !d. 
20. See id. at 1193. 
21. See id. 
22. See id. 
23. See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1193. 
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dent from developing her full intellectual:Rotential and receiv-
ing the most from the academic program. 
Thus, the court concluded that just as Title VII allows 
monetary damages for a hostile work environment, so Title IX 
should allow a private action for monetary damages for a hos-
tile school environment due to peer sexual harassment. 25 In or-
der for the school district to be held liable, they must "know-
ingly [fail] to take action to remedy a hostile environment 
caused by a student's sexual harassment of another. [The ra-
tionale being that] the harassed student 'has been denied the 
benefits of, or been subjected to discrimination under' that edu-
cational program in violation of Title IX."26 
B. The Fifth Circuit 
In April 1996, the Fifth Circuit in Rowinsky v. Bryan Inde-
pendent School District21 "concluded that Title IX was enacted 
pursuant to Title VI, and found that Title IX requires proof of 
intentional conduct on the part of the educational institution 
24. !d. (quoting Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 
1293 (N.D. Cal. 1993)). 
25. See Davis, 74 F. 3d at 1193. 
26. !d. at 1194 (quoting 20 U.S. C. § 1681(a)). 
27. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996), overruled by Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of 
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 638 (1999). The case involved two eighth grade girls, Janet and 
Jane, at Sam Rayburn Middle School. Janet was allegedly physically and verbally 
abused by G.S. on the school bus. He would swat her bottom and ask her questions 
about her bra and panty size. He also called her a whore. Janet complained to the bus 
driver several times, but to no avail. On another occasion, G.S. grabbed Jane's genital 
area and her breasts. Jane, Janet, and their parents complained to the school Assistant 
Principal. G.S. was suspended from riding the bus, and was later reassigned to sit be-
hind the bus driver. This did not deter G.S. and he continued to harass the girls. At 
another time, another male student L.H. harassed Janet by lifting up her skirt and 
making crude remarks. Janet complained to the bus driver, but he did not acknowledge 
her. Janet's mother complained to the assistant principal and gave him names of other 
victims; he said he would investigate and take action. L.H. was suspended for three 
days. A new bus driver was assigned and G.S. discontinued the harassment. Jane was 
assigned to sit next to G.S. Both girls were removed from the bus by their mother. Mrs. 
Rowinsky requested that G.S. be removed from the bus. Further action was refused by 
school authorities until there was proof of the alleged assaults from juvenile records. 
Yet another male student, F.F., unfastened Janet's bra by reaching under her shirt. He 
was suspended for the rest of the day and the day after, but his conduct was not con-
sidered sexual. Mrs. Rowinsky and her lawyer later met with the superintendent to 
complain about G.S.'s behavior. The superintendent said that the bus suspension had 
been sufficient action. They were not informed about Title IX or Title IX complaint pro-
cedures. Mrs. Rowinsky then filed the instant action, alleging that the school district 
and its officials condoned and caused hostile environment sexual harassment. !d. at 
1006-1009. 
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before monetary liability could be imposed. "28 
In so finding, the court looked to the statutory language of 
Title IX, as the Eleventh Circuit had done in Davis. 29 The court 
determined that the language of Title IX does not apply to the 
conduct of third parties; rather, it only applies to discrimina-
tion by the funding recipient. The court justified its position 
with the statute's structure, legislative history, and the De-
partment of Education's Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") interpre-
tation of the statute. 30 
OCR's interpretation "considers peer hostile environment 
racial harassment a violation of title VI," but fails to comment 
upon whether such an interpretation a~plies to third parties 
and not solely to the recipient's actions. 1 Analogizing Title IX 
principles, the court concluded that in order for a plaintiff to 
successfully bring a peer sexual harassment action, she "must 
demonstrate that the school district responded to sexual har-
assment claims differently based on sex."32 Rowinsky thus 
failed to show that the school had responded differently to her 
daughters' assault claims than to those allegations made by 
boys at the school. 
C. The Conflict 
Taking into consideration the Eleventh Circuit's decision in 
Davis and the Fifth Circuit's decision in Rowinsky, the circuits 
were not only in conflict as to the standard of liability for a suc-
cessful peer sexual harassment claim, but also as to the ration-
ale and applicable principles underlying such claims. While one 
circuit allowed third-party actions to constitute claims as long 
as the school district knowingly failed to take action, the other 
circuit only allowed such an action if the school's treatment of 
peer harassment allegations was different based upon the com-
plainer's sex. Additionally, the circuits' interpretations of Title 
IX and the Congressional intent behind the statute varied. Be-
cause the approaches to peer sexual harassment were varied 
and conflicting, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Davis 
28. Megan Healy, Responding to Students' Pleas for Relief: The Need for a Consis· 
tent Approach to Peer Sexual Harassment Claims, Comment, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 4 79, 
501 (1997). 
29. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1011. 
30. See id. at 1011-16. 
31. ld. at 1016. 
32. ld. 
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in order to resolve the conflict. 
II. DAVIS V. MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
LaShonda Davis, a fifth grader at Hubbard Elementary in 
Monroe County, Georgia, was allegedly sexuall¥
3 
harassed re-
peatedly by one of her fellow classmates, G.F. The harass-
ment allegedly began in December of 1992, when G.F. told 
LaShonda, "I want to get in bed with you," and "I want to feel 
your boobs," while attempting to touch her breasts and genital 
area.
34 Comparable actions allegedly occurred on or about 
January 4 and 20, 1993.35 LaShonda reported these actions to 
her mother and to her teacher, Diane Fort.36 Her mother in 
turn also contacted Ms. Fort and was told that the principal, 
Bill Querry, knew of the reported conduct.37 
Allegedly, G.F. continued to harass LaShonda for months. 
In early February, during their physical education class, G.F. 
reportedly placed a door stop in his pants and acted in a sexu-
ally suggestive manner toward LaShonda.38 She allegedly re-
ported the incident to her physical education teacher, Whit 
Maples.39 About a week later, G.F. harassed LaShonda again. 
LaShonda reported the occurrence to another supervising 
teacher, Joyce Pippen, and the petitioner again contacted the 
40 teacher to follow up. 
Petitioner alleged that another incident of sexual harass-
ment occurred in early March in physical education class, and 
that the incident was again reported by LaShonda to both Ma-
ples and Pippen.41 In April 1993, G.F. purportedly rubbed his 
body in a sexually suggestive manner against LaShonda in the 
school hallway, which she again reported to Fort.42 The har-
assment ended in May, when G.F. was charged with, and 
33. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. ofEduc., 119 S. Ct. 1661, 1666 (1999). 
34. Id. at 1667. 
35. See id. 
36. See id. 
37. See id. 
38. See id. 
39. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1667. 
40. See id. 
41. See id. 
42. See id. 
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pleaded guilty to, sexual battery.43 
Petitioner alleged that during these months of harassment, 
LaShonda suffered greatly.44 Specifically, her grades dropped 
due to an inability to concentrate on her school work.45 In addi-
tion, her father reported having found a suicide note in April 
1993.46 Moreover, petitioner further alleged that LaShonda told 
her that she "didn't know how much longer she could keep G.F. 
off her."47 Petitioner alleged that the school failed in these 
months of harassment to take any disciplinary action in re-
sponse to G.F.'s behavior.48 Additionally, petitioner alleged that 
she not only spoke with the teachers, but that in May she also 
spoke with Principal Querry, asking him what action would be 
taken against G.F. In response, Querry said, "I guess I'll have 
to threaten him a little bit harder," and asked her why 
LaShonda "was the only one complaining."49 
The com~laint alleged that other girls fell victim to G.F.'s 
harassment. 0 Allegedly a group of girls, including LaShonda, 
attempted to speak with Querry about G.F.'s conduct. How-
ever, the girls were denied their request by a teacher who said, 
51 
"If Querry wants you, he'll call you." 
Although LaShonda had reported G.F.'s harassment for 
months, the school made no effort to separate them.52 Accord-
ing to the complaint, it was only after more than three months, 
that LaShonda was even allowed to chanre her seat so that she 
would no longer have to sit next to G.F.5 Furthermore, the pe-
titioner alleged that the Monroe County Board of Education 
("Board") had not instructed its personnel on responding to 
peer sexual harassment, nor had it issued a policy on the mat-
ter. 54 
Petitioner filed suit on May 4, 1994 in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, against the 
43. See id. 
44. See id. 
45. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1667. 
46. I d. 
47. I d. 
48. See id. 
49. I d. 
50. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1667. 
51. I d. 
52. See id. 
53. See id. 
54. See id. 
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Board, the school superintendent, and Principal Querry, seek-
ing compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees, and 
injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that under Title IX, the 
Board was a recipient of federal funds and that: 
'the persistent sexual advances and harassment by the stu-
dent G.F. upon [LaShonda] interfered with her ability to at-
tend school and perform her studies and activities,' and that 
'[t]he deliberate indifference by Defendants to the unwelcome 
sexual advances of a student upon LaShonda created an in-
timidating, hostile, offensive and abus[ive] school environ-
ment in violation of Title IX.'55 
The defendants filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 56 The dis-
trict court granted the motion, stating that under Title IX only 
federally funded institutions could be sued and that the indi-
vidual defendants could not.57 As to the Board, the court stated 
that Title IX only provided a basis for liability if the Board or 
an employee of the Board had any role in the harassment. 58 Pe-
titioner appealed the district court's decision and an Eleventh 
Circuit panel reversed. 59 
The panel analogized Title VII law and a majority con-
cluded that under Title IX failure to stop peer sexual harass-
ment was an actionable claim against the Board. The Board's 
motion for rehearing en bane was granted by the Eleventh Cir-
cuit.60 The District Court's decision was affirmed.61 The en bane 
court concluded that "Title IX ... provides recipients with no-
tice that they must stop their employees from engaging in dis-
criminatory conduct, but the statute fails to provide a recipient 
with sufficient notice of a duty to prevent student-on-student 
harassment."62 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve 
the circuit conflict.63 In reversing the Eleventh Circuit, the 
Court held that a private action for damages exists under Title 
55. /d. at 1668. 
56. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1668. 
57. See id. 
58. See id. 
59. See id. 
60. See id. 
61. See id. 
62. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1668 (discussing Davis, 120 F.3d at 1401). 
63. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. OfEduc., 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1998). 
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IX against a school board for peer sexual harassment if the 
funding recipient is deliberately indifferent to the harassment, 
the recipient has actual knowledge of the sexual harassment, 
and the harassment is so severe, pervasive, and objectively of-
fensive that it deprives the victims access to the educational 
opportunities or benefits the school provides.64 
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S REASONING 
The Court recognized the conflict within the circuits and set 
out to resolve "whether, and under what circumstances, a re-
cipient of federal educational funds can be liable in a private 
damages action arising from student-on-student sexual har-
assment ... "65 The Court had previously recognized a private 
right of action for money damages under Title IX. 66 However, 
such money damages are only available if the Title IX federal 
funding recipient has adequate notice of liability for the ac-
tion.67 Such notice must be clear and unambiguous in the lan-
guage of the statute, as Congress is acting through its spending 
power.68 In so generating legislation, Congress has effectively 
invoked a contract with the states and "in return for federal 
funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed condi-
tions."69 Under such power, Congress can therefore only hold 
funding recipients liable for their own actions and not the ac-
tions of third parties. 70 
Respondents argued that the petitioner sought to hold the 
Board liable for the actions of a third party, G.F.'s, and not 
their own. 71 The Court disagreed, stating that "petitioner at-
tempted to hold the Board liable for its own decision to remain 
idle in the face of known student-on-student harassment in its 
schools"72 and not for G.F.'s harassing conduct. The bar on li-
ability concerns the Gebser adequate notice requirement. In 
64. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1669-76. 
65. ld. at 1668. 
66. See id. at 1669 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 
60, 112S.C~ 1028(1992». 
67. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1670. 
68. See id. 
69. ld. (quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 
17 (1981». 
70. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1670. 
71. See id. 
72. ld. 
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Gebser, the court found that the school had notice because it 
clearly violated the terms of the statute by deliberately remain-
ing indifferent in the face of discrimination. 73 This deliberate 
indifference standard rejected any notions of agency principles 
(imputing the actions of others on the Board) or negligence. In-
stead, it imposed upon the school district liability for its own 
official decision to remain indifferent to the harassment.74 Ad-
ditionally, the court stated that public schools have long been 
on notice that they can be held liable for their failure to re-
spond to the discriminating actions of third parties. 75 
The common law as well as state courts have put schools on 
notice for "failure to protect students from the tortious acts of 
third parties," including their peers.76 However, not any third 
party will trigger liability. The deliberate indifference standard 
only applies when the school has some degree of control over 
the harassing party.77 The funding recipient must have been 
able to take action against the third farty; otherwise, its indif-
ference would not allow for liability. 7 
This deliberate indifference must subject the students to 
harassment, or at a minimum, '"cause' students 'to undergo' 
harassment or 'make them liable or vulnerable' to it."79 In order 
for the school to be liable, the harassment must occur in an 
area or at an event which is under the funding recipient's con-
trol. 80 The analysis is as follows: 
These factors combine to limit a recipient's damages liability 
to circumstances wherein the recipient exercises substantial 
control over both the harasser and the context in which the 
known harassment occurs. Only then can the recipient be said 
to 'expose' its students to harassment or 'cause' them to un-
dergo it 'under' the recipient's programs.81 
As applied to the case at bar, the sexual harassment took 
place on school grounds, mainly in the classroom, and under 
the supervision of school teachers. In this case, the funding re-
73. See id. 
74. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1671. 
75. !d. 
76. !d. at 1671-72. 
77. See id. at 1672. 
78. See id. 
79. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1671. 
80. See id. 
81. !d. 
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cipient maintained a substantial amount of control over the ha-
rasser.82 The Court recognized that public school officials main-
tain a substantial amount of control over studentsg'
3 
much more 
than an employer would over adult employees. They con-
cluded that "recipients of federal funding may be liable for 'sub-
jecting' their students to discrimination where the recipient is 
deliberately indifferent to known acts of student-on-student 
sexual harassment and the harasser is under the school's disci-
1. th 't "84 p mary au on y. 
Furthermore, the Court placed limits on the liability, stat-
ing that it would not engage in second guessing the discipline 
decisions made by school officials.85 Funding recipients must 
respond to incidents of peer sexual harassment in a way that is 
"not clearly unreasonable."86 Administrators will still have the 
flexibility to respond to discipline situations in a manner in 
which they deem fit. 87 It is only when their "response to the 
harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of 
the known circumstances," that they may encounter liability.88 
Moreover, the standard is flexible and directly corresponds to 
the amount of control the school can exercise over its stu-
dents.89 Thus, a university would not be expected to exercise 
the same degree of control as an elementary school, "and it 
would be entirely reasonable for a school to refrain from a form 
of disciplinary action that would expose it to constitutional or 
statutory claims."90 
Students deserve to benefit from their education and should 
not be denied access to those benefits based upon their gender. 
Such denial to access does not have to be a physical barrier to 
entrance, but the sexual harassment must be "so severe, perva-
sive, and objectively offensive, and that [it] so undermines and 
detracts from the victims' educational experience, that the vic-
tim-students are effectively denied equal access to an institu-
82. See id. at 1673. 
83. See id. 
84. !d. 
85. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1674. 
86. !d. 
87. See id. 
88. !d. 
89. See id. 
90. See id. 
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tion's resources and opportunities."91 It is possible that a single 
instance can rise to the level of severity required. However, the 
Court felt it unlikely that such an instance would meet the 
standard due to the "inevitability of student misconduct and 
the amount of litigation that would be invited by entertaining 
claims of official indifference to a single instance of one-on-one 
peer harassment."92 The Court thus limited peer sexual har-
assment money damages actions to those cases "havin& a sys-
temic effect on educational programs or activities .... "9 
Whether a particular situation of harassment elevates to 
the level of actionable harassment depends upon the ages of 
the harasser and the victim, the number of people involved, the 
relationships involved9 the circumstances, and the expectations involved in the event. 4 The Court recognized that children do 
act in manners that are inappropriate for adults and stated 
that: 
[d]amages are not available for simple acts of teasing and 
name-calling among school children, however, even where 
these comments target differences in gender. Rather, in the 
context of student-on-student harassment, damages are 
available only where the behavior is so severe, pervasive, and 
objectively offensive that it denies its victims the equal access 
to education that Title IX is designed to protect.95 
Additionally, a mere drop in grades is insufficient to prove 
that harassment is actionable.96 As is the case here, a grade de-
cline provides evidence of a possible connection between the 
harasser's conduct and the denial of educational benefits, but 
the plaintiffs claim also relies heavily upon the severity of the 
harassment and the school's knowledge and deliberate indiffer-
ence to the harassment. 97 
IV. WHY SHOULD SCHOOLS BE HELD RESPONSIBLE? 
The Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights 
("OCR") states that it has long recognized peer sexual harass-
91. Davis, 119 at 1675. 
92. ld. at 1676. 
93. ld. 
94. See id. at 1675. 
95. Id. 
96. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1676. 
97. See id. 
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ment to be a violation of Title IX. 98 OCR is committed to: 
[t]he elimination of sexual harassment of students in feder-
ally assisted educational programs [because it] is a high prior-
ity for OCR. Through its enforcement of Title IX, OCR has 
learned that a significant number of students, both male and 
female, have experienced sexual harassment, that sexual 
harassment can interfere with a student's academic perform-
ance and emotional and physical well-being, and that pre-
venting and remedying sexual harassment in schools is essen-
tial to ensure nondiscriminatory, safe environments in which 
99 
students can learn. 
Schools were created to educate students on the basics: 
reading, writing, and arithmetic. Society's view of the educa-
tion system's responsibilities have changed significantly. Now 
schools are not only responsible for teaching the "three R's," 
but they are also to teach students to become productive mem-
bers of society. This productive member responsibility is quite 
broad, and among many things includes teaching students so-
cial skills. Social skills involve same sex interactions as well as 
opposite gender relations. From a very young age, children 
learn how to relate with one another. Although social skills are 
taught in the home, many social skills are taught in the 
schools, for this is where children come into contact with vari-
ous personalities and get involved in various social situations 
and altercations. Thus, it has become and will continue to 
evolve into another responsibility for our public education sys-
tem. 
In order to provide such education, our schools need to be 
safe. Students need to feel comfortable and welcome at school 
so that they can enhance their learning potential in a positive 
learning environment. 100 Thus, in the case of peer sexual har-
assment, a school's mission is two-fold: to educate their stu-
dents about sexual harassment to help them develop social 
skills, and to prevent, deter, and punish sexual harassment ac-
tions in order to create and maintain a safe and effective learn-
98. See Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment 
Guidance: Harassment of Students by Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 
(visited Sept. 30, 1999) <www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/sexharOO.html>. 
99. Id. 
100. See Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, et. a!., Sexual Harassment in Schools: An 
Analysis of the "Knew or Should Have Known" Liability Standard in Title IX Peer Sex-
ual Harassment Cases, 12 Wrs. WOMEN'S L.J. 301, 319-320 (1997). 
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ing environment. 
Sexual harassment is a serious and pervasive problem in so-
ciety. In elementary, middle and high school, students ob-
serve, experience and participate in sexual harassment of 
their peers. Eventually, these students enter the workforce, 
where thf~ observe, experience and participate in sexual har-
assment. 
Children learn by example. If students see other students 
engaging in sexually harassing behavior, and also see that such 
behavior is ignored by authority figures, then students learn 
that such behavior is acceptable. "Furthermore, 'ignoring cer-
tain behavior sends a message of inequality to girls . . . and 
sets the stage for how men and women treat each other as 
adults.' Thus, men and boys will not realize the inappropriate-
ness of their behavior and will continue to behave in a similar 
102 
manner.'' 
If sexual harassment is permitted in schools, female stu-
dents are not only seen as unequal to their male peers, but 
their self-esteem is endangered as well. 
Every harassing act engenders in girls the feeling that they 
are inferior persons. Sexual harassment impedes the emo-
tional and educational development of young girls who admit 
feeling embarrassed, afraid, angry, frustrated, and powerless 
in school. The ramifications extend beyond the psychological, 
as girls report suffering physical symptoms like insomnia, 
listlessness, and depression. In the end, the manifestation of 
concrete consequences, such as absenteeism, tardiness, de-
creased classroom participation, and poor scholastic perform-
ance illustrate the severe impact harassin~ behavior has on a 
girl's ability to receive an equal education. 3 
Therefore, female students are unable to receive an educa-
tion equivalent to that of their male peers because sexual har-
assment significantly disrupts the learning process. Schools are 
in the business of educating, and if some students are notre-
ceiving that education due to a barrier created at school by 
other students, then the school officials should have a duty to 
101. ld. at 301. 
102. Id. at 303-04 (quoting Monica Sherer, No Longer Just Child's Play: School 
Liability Under Title IX For Sexual Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2135 (1993). 
103. Laura M. Sullivan, Note, An Evolutionary Perspective of Peer Sexual Harass-
ment in American Schools: Premising Liability on Sexual, Rather than Power Dynam-
ics, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 329, 341-42 (1997). 
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eliminate that barrier. 
V. WHAT ARE SCHOOLS TO Do Now? 
In Davis, the Supreme Court recognized a school's respon-
sibility to educate and protect students. The Court imposed li-
ability upon school districts for peer sexual harassment if the 
school was "deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of 
which they have actual knowledge, that is so severe, pervasive, 
and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the vic-
tims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits pro-
vided by the school."104 In order to meet this standard, schools 
must respond to sexual harassment claims made by their stu-
dents. The Court emphasized that the responsibility for stu-
dent discipline rests solely with school officials and that the 
Court did not wish to engage in second guessing such deci-
sions.105 "[T]he recipient must merely respond to known ~eer 
harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable."1 6 
Thus, the Court requires that school officials respond to 
known harassment in a "not clearly unreasonable" manner. 
This high burden that a plaintiff must prove (that the school 
has been deliberately indifferent to the harassment) is benefi-
cial to school districts and boards. The burden protects them 
from monetary responsibility for every incident or even most 
incidents of peer sexual harassment. However, the requirement 
does nothing to address how schools can and should try to 
eliminate sexual harassment in the first place so that they can 
not only avoid liability, but more importantly, so that all stu-
dents receive an equal education. 
Schools should establish a sexual harassment policy as well 
as an education program. It is important to institute a preven-
tion program and to establish and effectuate a discipline policy 
for occurrences of sexual harassment. 
A. What is Sexual Harassment? 
Before schools can implement programs, punish harassers, 
and eventually stop sexual harassment, school officials must 
understand what sexual harassment is so that they can further 
104. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1675. 
105. See id. at 1674. 
106. Id. 
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educate their employees and students. There is no exact or 
clear definition of sexual harassment, but we do need some sort 
of working definition. 107 In the case of peer sexual harassment, 
harassment occurs when unwelcome sexual advances, re-
quests for sexual favors, and other verbal, nonverbal, or 
physical conduct of a nature by another student ... are suffi-
ciently severe, persistent, or pervasive to limit a student's 
ability to participate in or benefit from an educational pro-
gram or activity or to create a hostile or abusive educational 
environment. Sexual harassment includes conduct that is also 
criminal in nature such as rape, sexual assault, stalking, and 
similar offenses. 108 
Examples of sexual harassment include, but are not limited 
to, uninvited or unwelcome sexual touching, sexual verbal 
abuse, unwelcome invitations or demands for sexual behaviors, 
and unwelcome sexual words or symbols directed at a stu-
dent.109 
B. Implementing a Sexual Harassment Policy and Discipline 
Procedure 
Once school officials can define sexual harassment, they 
will be well on their way to identifying it and eventually elimi-
nating it from their schools. Officials should institute a school-
wide sexual harassment policy. This policy should be written 
and should be disseminated to all students, faculty, and em-
ployees, and should be prominently posted at the school site.110 
School officials should consider adding such a written policy 
statement to their code of conducts, which are regularly dis-
seminated to the student body, and to personnel handbooks.m 
The policy should contain the following elements: 
• The school's commitment to protect students from 
harassment; 
107. See Monica Sherer, No Longer Just Child's Play: School Liability Under Title 
IX For Sexual Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2125 (1993). 
108. Department of Education Office of Civil Rights, Protecting Students from 
Harassment and Hate Crime: A Guide for Schools, (last modified Jan. 1999) 
<www.ed.gov./pubs/Harassment/policy1.html >. 
109. See id. 
110. See id. 
111. See id. 
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• A definition of sexual harassment and examples of 
such; 
• Require reporting of incidents by both the staff and 
students; 
• Explain the importance of reporting harassment and 
the steps to do so; 
• Describe the steps the school will take to prevent as 
well as discipline those engaging in the harassment; 
• Prohibit retaliation against those reporting incidents; 
• Make sure that all have knowledge of their individual 
rights and duties. 112 
In addition to a written policy, schools should also develop a 
discipline and investigation procedure for incidents of harass-
ment. School officials should "identify and respond to all inci-
dents of harassment .... "113 One person in the school should be 
designated as the one to receive and investigate the com-
plaints.114 This person could be but does not have to be the 
school's compliance officer. The person should be a school offi-
cial who understands the urgency and importance of prohibit-
ing sexual harassment. This person should be trained in the 
procedures and in receiving complaints. 115 Students and em-
ployees alike should be aware of who the designated official is. 
The reporting procedure should be simple and easy enough as 
to not deter reporting incidents. This school harassment official 
should also be someone who has the authority to "take correc-
tive action."116 Additionally: 
[s]chool personnel should not overlook incidents that, viewed 
alone, may not rise to the level of unlawful harassment. Con-
sistent enforcement ... and meaningful interventions by staff 
to teach appropriate behavior will tend to discourage more se-
vere misconduct and to help achieve an atmosphere of respect 
112. See id. 
113. Id. 
114. See Department of Education Office of Civil Rights, Protecting Students from 
Harassment and Hate Crime: A Guide for Schools, (last modified Jan. 1999) 
<www.ed.gov./pubs/Harassment/policyl.html >. 
115. See id. 
116. Id. 
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117 
and courtesy. 
C. Education as Prevention: Educating the Entire School 
Once a policy and disciplinary procedures have been devel-
oped, they need to be implemented. The most effective way for 
this to happen is to educate the entire school community. 
School officials should begin by educating themselves and their 
staff through staff in-service training sessions. 118 Students 
should also be educated through curriculum, activity and me-
diation programs, and presentations by outside officials and 
law enforcement agents. 119 The important thing is to educate 
the entire school community in order to "overcome ignorance, 
. t t db' "120 m1s rus , an 1ases. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Davis makes clear that peer sexual harassment is identifia-
bly sexual discrimination under Title IX and actionable for 
monetary damages if school officials are knowingly indifferent 
to the harassment. The Court says that schools must not 
clearly unreasonably respond to students' allegations. How-
ever, if schools only discipline, the problem of peer sexual har-
assment will never go away. Schools must do more than just 
respond to allegations- they must attack the source of the 
problem. They must educate the entire school community con-
cerning sexual harassment in order to eliminate the myths, as-
sumptions, biases, stereotypes, and misconduct. Through 
proper education, schools can effectively curb incidents of sex-
ual harassment among students. This will allow them to effec-
tuate their goal of providing an equal education to all of their 
students and help them truly produce socially responsible and 
productive members of society. 
Lillian Chaves 
117. Id. 
118. See id. 
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